
Reviewed by M. Guy Thompson, Berkeley, CA

The relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis has always been a tortured one, going all the way back to Freud’s relatively late essay, “The e Question of a Weltanschauung (1933),” as to the irrelevance of philosophical thinking in the psychoanalytic situation with his provocative statement that philosophy “has no direct influence on the great mass of mankind [as] it is of interest to only a small number even of the top layer of intellectuals and is scarcely intelligible to anyone else” (p. 161). This chilling observation served to legitimize a legion of subsequent psychoanalysts who found solace in Freud’s words for their own dismissal of philosophy’s relevance to the psychoanalytic enterprise. I don’t think anyone really believes that Freud took his own statement to heart; his dismissal of the academic who Freud believed was lost in an ivory tower, cut off from the everyday passions of “ordinary folk,” isn’t unlike the attitude most people today share toward the so-called intellectual egghead who is divorced from the practicalities of real life. In that sense Freud could be seen as a man of the people rather than, strictly speaking, anti-philosophical. Freud’s own undeniable debt to a host of both classical and contemporary philosophers in the development of his most enduring ideas (e.g., Empedocles, Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Montaigne, Spinoza, Kant, John Stuart Mill immediately come to mind) lends a fiction to his statement, but the myth continues to this day, cited by analysts who haven’t the slightest interest in or acumen for philosophical thinking. Yet Freud is incomprehensible without an appreciation for his debt to philosophy, for the fundamental questions that continue to concern us about the development of psychoanalytic thinking and practice are philosophical in their nature, even if we don’t know it. Despite the continuing uneasy relationship between these two disciplines, there have been many psychoanalysts since Freud who have not been as cagey about their relationship with and debt to philosophy, including Hans Loewald, the subject of Jonathan Lear’s book inspired by Loewald’s famous paper, “On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis” (1960). Indeed, Loewald not only relied on philosophy for the development of his psychoanalytic perspective, he was among those rare psychoanalysts who was also philosophically trained and philosophically mindful in his careful reading of Freud’s psychoanalytic theories and method. Unlike most philosophically-minded analysts who sprinkle their publications with citations from and references to the philosopher or philosophers with whom they are taken, Loewald’s debt to philosophy was a relatively subtle affair. Loewald even resisted coining new terms—a commonplace among analytic authors whether or not they are indebted to philosophy—but chose instead to remain faithful to Freud’s basic nomenclature, even if Loewald systematically revised Freud’s meaning from the lens of his own philosophical perspective.

As Lear notes, the philosopher to whom Loewald owed so much was Martin Heidegger, with whom Loewald studied in Germany before immigrating to the United States in the aftermath of Hitler’s rise to power. Despite Loewald’s break with Heidegger after the latter’s disturbing affiliation with Hitler’s National Socialist Party, it is admirable that Loewald never hesitated to acknowledge his profound debt to Heidegger, without which it is difficult to imagine what Loewald’s psychoanalytic perspective would have looked like. Yet, were it not for Loewald’s acknowledgment to Heidegger in the preface of his collected *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (1980) most readers would be hard pressed to recognize any evidence of this debt. Loewald’s writing is not striking or apparently innovative in relation to either the terms he
employs or the theories he puts forward. On the surface of it, his perspective is that of a typical American ego psychologist who, following Freud, conceptualizes his treatment philosophy in relation to libido theory, the structural model comprised of id, ego, and superego, the Oedipus complex and other standard Freudian terminology. In fact, the only extended reference in all of Loewald’s writings to Heidegger’s philosophy appears in his short book on Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual (1978) where he refers to Heidegger’s concept of thrownness (p. 19). Yet Loewald was not uncritical of what he took to be the excesses of the conventional ego psychological perspective, including its fidelity to Freud’s theory of instincts, which Loewald rejected in place of what he characterized as a more “relational” perspective (this term was subsequently co-opted by Steven Mitchell for his own, interpersonal-based relational psychoanalysis). Loewald also abandoned the obsession with analysis of resistance that continues to epitomize the conventional ego psychological perspective once he realized that such “monitoring” is antithetical to the kind of phenomenological—and patient—framework that Heidegger advocated (Leavy, 1986). It is in this context that reading the work of Jonathan Lear is such a pleasure for those analysts who appreciate philosophy and its role in the psychoanalytic process. Like Loewald, Lear is also a philosophically trained psychoanalyst and confesses that much of his debt to his own psychoanalytic perspective derives from informal conversations that he enjoyed with Loewald over a period of six years. In many respects Lear’s book is an homage to Loewald’s legacy, particularly Loewald’s paper on therapeutic action which is cited throughout Lear’s study. But as the subtitle to his book implies, it is also a study in irony and its role in the psychoanalytic process. This portion of the book owes less to Loewald than to Plato and Kierkegaard, but it is in reference to Loewald and his relationship with Heidegger that will be of principal interest to the readers of this journal, so I will concentrate the thrust of my commentary on that portion of Lear’s examination of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. I am nonetheless also obliged to review the gist of the book as a whole in order to render Lear’s references to Heidegger meaningful in the overall context of his argument.

Though Lear is not a phenomenologist and has distinguished himself as a philosopher on the basis of an earlier book on Aristotle, he was apparently inspired (and perhaps required) to engage in his own study of Heidegger’s work in the process of coming to terms with Loewald’s psychoanalytic perspective and its debt to Heidegger’s philosophy. To this end Lear cites the section of Heidegger’s Being and Time devoted to his concept of worldhood (which figures prominently in a chapter devoted to “Transference and Worldliness”) as well conversations with a University of Chicago colleague, John Haugeland, a prominent Heidegger scholar. This is unfortunately a mixed bag as Lear’s familiarity with Heidegger’s thinking is limited and perhaps too dependent on the research he was obliged to perform in order to address Loewald’s relationship with Heidegger. Yet Lear doesn’t say much about Heidegger’s impact on Loewald’s thinking, so the book is not conceived as a study of Loewald and Heidegger per se, but engages in a somewhat tangential treatment of the two, which will be something of a disappointment to those readers who are familiar with Heidegger’s thought. It is a pity that Lear is not familiar with the extensive literature on Heidegger’s impact on those psychoanalysts who, while influenced by Freud, were identified with an existential perspective, such as Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, and R. D. Laing, all of whom were, like Lear, critical of Freud’s positivistic conception of transference phenomena (as well as his conception of the unconscious) and would have been useful in Lear’s exploration of this topic. Consequently, this is perhaps not one of Lear’s best efforts in comparison with his earlier and impressive output on the intersection between philosophy and psychoanalysis.
This is a wide-ranging work that touches on a number of seemingly disparate topics that Lear strives to bring together within the context of the two overarching themes of his study: the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis and its relation to irony. To this end he explores the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, the psychoanalytic concept of internalization, the relation between love and drive, and the relation between transference and worldliness or worldliness. I will review these topics in turn and conclude this review with Lear’s treatment of Heidegger. First let me say that I am a great admirer of Lear’s work and am in general agreement with many aspects of his reading of Freud, his criticisms of recent developments in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking and practice, and the way that he weaves philosophical thinking into his psychoanalytic perspective. There are many wonderful things in this book that I would be inclined to emphasize were this review intended for a psychoanalytic journal instead of one devoted to phenomenological psychology. One of the great things about Lear’s philosophical perspective is the way he is always thinking (in the sceptical sense) about things that analysts are often far too quick to assume that they know. Thinking is difficult for analysts who have not been educated in philosophy because “knowing” what they are talking about is something they are typically too invested in to their detriment. I also appreciate Lear’s conversational style of writing, which is unusual for both psychoanalysts and philosophers. His writing is relatively free of jargon and when he does invoke technical terms it is almost always for the purpose of examining such terms in detail, instead of taking it for granted that he and the reader secretly “know” what the terms mean and share this conspiratorial piece of knowledge between them. This is virtually unheard of in psychoanalytic publications and is a credit to Lear’s philosophical integrity while setting him apart from the psychoanalytic mainstream. These virtues are apparent in all of Lear’s writing and is in abundant evidence in this work.

Lear begins his study by asking the question, what is therapeutic action and how are we to understand its efficacy in the psychoanalytic situation? This is a wonderful question to raise and, as stated earlier, its inspiration is indebted to Loewald’s paper on this topic. There is considerable debate in the psychoanalytic community as to what changes patients in psychoanalysis and how such change affects the participants on both sides of the psychoanalytic equation: the part played by the analytic practitioner and the part played by the designated patient. The concept of therapeutic action pertains to both, as the process of psychoanalysis, says Loewald, is not about how an observer (the analyst) and the observed (the patient) comprise a unity, but rather how they come together to constitute a dichotomous pair. This is an idea that has been seized upon by contemporary relational analysts, as though they invented the idea, but it has been there since the inception of the analytic institution invented by Freud, even if the language he employs—and especially its translation into English!—give the appearance of something that is more scientific than interpersonal. Loewald’s singular achievement is his fidelity to Freud’s conceptual vocabulary while “stretching” Freud’s language to fit a more humanistic conception of the process. Yet whatever theory or technique to which one is inclined, there are only so many notions as to what has to happen in the course of the psychoanalytic experience for it to be of value to the patient. Some analysts, for example (e.g., Kleinians) suggest that it comes down to insight, while others (e.g., the British Middle School) suggest that it derives from the evolution of the transference that every patient fashions with her analyst. Still others (e.g., Freud, Lacan) characterize change as deriving from a talking cure, wherein insight and transference play a less central role in lieu of the patient’s ability to participate in the free associative process, i.e., simply giving voice to thoughts, feelings, and observations that they have never uttered to anyone, or if they have without the profundity that the psychoanalytic situation can generate. Thus we may utter things without commensurate insight and still benefit from having discovered the means to say it nonetheless. These are the three principal conceptions of psychoanalytic change, though most analysts
would argue they are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, insight can cover a wide range of application. Some analysts emphasize insight into the evolving transference (e.g., Merton Gill) whereas others emphasize insight into the myriad ways that a given patient engages in resistance to the process (e.g., Paul Gray). And then there’s the role of interpretation: should it be used to further insight into the transference, the resistance, or etiological aspects of one’s symptoms, or should it be employed to further the patient’s capacity for and participation in free association? Therapeutic action serves to both address and define how a given analyst conceives this process and how it serves to culminate in a satisfactory treatment experience. Lear’s principal concern in addressing the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis is twofold: first he wants to take issue with the prevailing ego psychological bias that a satisfactory analysis relies on the degree to which patients successfully “internalize the benign superego” of the analyst prior to termination; second he wants to demonstrate why developing a capacity for irony is a far more relevant task on which the analyst and patient should be focused. I will take up the question of internalization later, but for now I will turn to the problem of irony and the role to which Lear assigns it.

Lear’s treatment of irony is both complicated and confusing. He seems particularly taken with the Socratic tradition depicted by Plato in which Socrates professed ignorance about all the knowledge claims that his contemporaries pretended to know, but under the scrutiny of Socrates’ interrogation revealed such claims to lack substance. Lear takes umbrage with conventional notions of irony that tend to reduce it to contradictory statements and that imply that Socrates knew the answer to his queries but pretended not to. Lear argues that Socrates was sincere in professing his ignorance and that he genuinely wanted to know answers, but was unable to find them. This dynamic epitomizes Lear’s position on irony and how it works in the psychoanalytic process.

For example, the analyst’s neutrality is not a feigned ignorance, but a genuine one, for the analyst who is able to maintain neutrality in the Socratic sense doesn’t really know what is going on, but seeks to, relentlessly. This is an inherently sceptic device that Socrates was one of the first Greek philosophers to develop. Lear goes on to cite Kierkegaard (another famous sceptic) in laying out his notion of irony that relies on the manifestation of contradiction, disparity, ambiguity, and paradox in the psychoanalytic situation, again epitomized by Freud’s conception of neutrality. It is thus “ironic” that Lear does not explore the sceptic philosophical tradition, partly inaugurated by Socrates, but developed more explicitly by the Hellenistic sceptic philosophers led by Pyrro and, later, Sextus Empiricus. The sceptics took Socrates as their inspiration and were known for their adherence to a philosophy method—suspension of judgment—that they believed “cured” neurotic fixations on the quest for certainty; to cure oneself of this quest was believed to result in happiness or serenity, a freedom from anxiety epitomized by a state of unperturbedness. Though this tradition was subsequently suppressed by Christianity, it reemerged in the sixteenth-century in the writings of the French essayist and philosopher, Michel de Montaigne. Montaigne exerted an extraordinary influence on post-Cartesian philosophers, including Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Nietzsche. He also influenced Freud and his conception of neutrality and its essentially non-judgmental aspect. Irony is an undeniably psychoanalytic attitude on which Roy Schafer wrote a famous paper (“The Psychoanalytic Vision of Reality” [1970]) that Lear cites, but for some reason does not explore. It seems to me that Lear’s argument is compromised by his omission of both its relevance to the sceptic tradition (especially in light of Kierkegaard) and Schafer’s insightful treatment of it. Lear, however, employs copious references to how irony appears in a clinical context that makes his critique of it more palpable. Another topic that occupies Lear’s attention is the problem of subjectivity and how it has been treated in the psychoanalytic literature. Lear is unhappy with the recent focus on
intersubjectivity by relational analysts and argues that the denial of so-called objective standards in the analytic process commits a folly in positing subjectivity or intersubjectivity in its place. This problem arises in the context of Freud’s conception of neutrality and its rejection among relational analysts who appear to misunderstand the subjective-objective dichotomy and its role in maintaining a non-biased, non-judgmental attitude in the nitty-gritty of the analytic process. I cannot do justice to this argument here, but I agree with Lear that the relational/ intersubjective paradigm is too hasty in its search for originality by throwing out the baby with the bathwater of analytic neutrality, a concept that Loewald adhered to and which also intersubjectivists rely upon, even if they don’t always appreciate it. Lear’s argument about the role that subjectivity plays in psychoanalysis is extensive and persuasive, but it is also surprising that he doesn’t focus more on its correlate, the inherently personal dimension to the analytic dyad. For example, on page 79 where Lear discusses the efficacy of medication for depression, he states that: “The idea that antidepressants can replace psychoanalysis . . . is a confusion; for it is to treat a person as though she were only a biological organism—a collation of nerves and tissues—as though there were no issue of what it is for her to develop as a person” (italics added). In other contexts Lear even equates the notion of the analytic subject with the personal dimension to the analytic relationship, but seems reluctant to develop the connection more explicitly. This is somewhat surprising given Loewald’s emphasis on this very issue, which he characterized as the inherently “relational” aspect to the dynamic. This is an important point, especially in the context of the purported role that science is presumed to play in both psychoanalytic theory and technique. This situation is developed further in Lear’s attention to the role of human nature, or being, or becoming human, all of which he connects with the Socratic tradition, the role to which science is assigned in psychoanalytic thinking, and the role of objectivity.

Lear’s discussion on internalization is appropriately one of the most important sections of the book, as this was a cardinal principle in Loewald’s conception of child development and the analytic process. Lear takes issue with the prevailing ego psychological view that in order for an analysis to terminate successfully it is critical that the analysand “internalize the benign superego of the analyst.” Following Paul Gray, Lear suggests that in so doing the analyst would blindly identify with these superego internalizations (i.e., to incorporate via identification those values of the analyst that represent the pursuit of psychic health and mature judgment) instead of analyzing them. Loewald conceived of internalization as far more extensive that a process of merely “incorporating” bits of the analyst into oneself; he saw it as the fundamental way that the psyche works, not just one of its functions. But Lear doesn’t connect Loewald’s conception of internalization with the latter’s debt to Heidegger, which is essential to appreciating what Loewald is getting at. He acknowledges that it concerns a way of “becoming” who you are via the relationship with another person, but Loewald was also influenced by Heidegger’s concept of thrownness and how the infant, for example, is “thrown” into a world of human interactions at birth and embarks on a never-ending process of incorporating (i.e., internalizing) everything in its world into itself, gradually making these influences an aspect of “who” the child is becoming. The process of internalization is thus alive and, as Nietzsche says, an inherently active process. The point Loewald is making is that, contrary to Freud, reality is not primarily in opposition to the ego, but is the environment (the Umwelt) out of which the inner world is organized and enriched. In other words, internalization, says Loewald, is not a defense; it is the opposite of repression and is always moving towards life. In the context of analysis, the treatment experience depends on the analyst’s ability to join the patient when the latter relaxes her grip on the secondary processes and renders the primary process more accessible. In this way, the global interaction of mother and child is revived, but in a positive way that leads to healing. This raises the role of the superego and how much Loewald’s conception of it diverges from standard ego psychology and how much it is
indebted to Heidegger’s conception of temporality, another connection that Lear does not explore (one of Loewald’s most “Heideggerian” papers was the one devoted to “Superego and Time” [1980, pp. 43–52]). Instead, Lear turns to Gray, the relentless interpreter of resistance who, in temperament and focus could not have been further from Loewald’s psychoanalytic sensibility! In his paper on time and superego, Loewald, following Heidegger, argues that psychic structures are temporal in nature; the superego is thus conceived as a future mode of the ego’s relationship with the world: “Only insofar as we are in advance of ourselves—conceive of ourselves as potentially more, stronger, better, or as less, weaker, worse than we are at present—can we be said to have a superego” (Loewald: 1980, p. 46). Any modifications of the analysand’s experience of time, constantly tweaked by the analyst’s interpretations of how the past and future are always connected to and embedded in the living present, lead to changes in the analysand’s lived world. This is Heidegger in his essence. I’m not sure how this fits with Paul Gray’s worry that the analyst’s superego may weave its way into the psychic structure of the analysand without being subjected to proper analysis. It seems to me that Gray is coming from a place of suspicion that the “person” of the analyst may impinge itself onto the analysand unless subjected to the relentless kind of analysis that he advocates, whereas Loewald sees both the figure of the analyst as well as her superego in a fundamentally more benign fashion, as did Heidegger. Perhaps this is a quibble, but Gray is not the first person I would think of to illustrate the gist of Loewald’s sensibility.

Lear’s critique of love, on the other hand, rests on firmer ground. Here he makes a point of crucial importance in distinguishing Freud’s conception of instinct from drive, a distinction that suffers from Strachey’s translation where he often translates both German terms into the English “instinct,” with the result of making Freud appear more biological than he was. Lear points out that after Freud’s revision of the pleasure principle with that of the death drive and the introduction of Eros as the love or life drive, love becomes much more central to Freud’s thinking than sex. According to Lear, Freud’s notion of drives was not rooted in a biological framework but a psychological one. The point he wants to make is that the tendency of object relations theorists to dismiss Freud’s drive theory as too biological is based on a misunderstanding of what Freud meant by drives, that they are world-directed rather than “internally” driven. Here it seems to me that Lear is trying to apply Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world to Freud’s concept of drive theory, but I’m not quite sure that he pulls it off. Lear never really explains what he takes a “drive” to be. If it is based on love rather than sex, then what is love in connection to our being “driven” by it? For Freud, however psychological his conception of love or sex was, it could never be severed from the fulcrum of the body’s need to reproduce itself and the physical enjoyment we derive from “sexual pleasure,” however we may displace such pleasure onto purely psychological objects via, for example, fetishes or sublimation. Lacan tried to remove it from biology and move it to processes of language and the search for recognition (ala’ Hegel) from others, but Lacan’s insistence on calling this a “drive” is problematic and Lear, in any case, is not taken with Lacan’s formulations either. This extremely important question is opened for discussion, but not satisfactorily resolved. Lear does point out that even Freud did not seem to realize how radical a revision his death drive model was and how his earlier thesis of love (culminating from the sex drive) is effectively turned on its head, where now love has precedence over sex. Loewald is critical of Freud’s preoccupation with the death (or Thanatos) side of the equation and, following Heidegger, even questions the ubiquitous nature of Freud’s conflict model of neurosis; now instead of a conflict between and pleasure and reality principles, we have a conflict between the life and death drives. It is interesting that Plato, from whom Freud conceived his notion of Eros, did not split off love from death (or aggression), but saw Eros in a more ambiguous light, as inhabiting both affectionate and destructive impulses. Freud never seemed able to overcome his need for two opposing
forces that “divide” us as creatures, even after recognizing later in life that there was something about this model that was untenable. I like Lear’s argument here and it is one of the strongest sections of his book. But it is when Lear turns his attention to transference and its connection with Heidegger’s concept of worldhood that Lear mounts his most explicit effort to incorporate aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy into his thinking. I have to admit that it isn’t at all clear to me what Lear means by the term “worldliness,” despite his position that it is Heidegger’s concept he is invoking. Positioning this term in the context of transference is problematic, as Heidegger rejects Freud’s conception of transference whereas Lear is using it to help us make sense of transference. He appears to be employing it as a “relational” (in Loewald’s sense of the term) concept to emphasize its social or environmental aspect and as a way of critiquing problems that Lear sees in Freud’s conceptualization of transference as a phenomenon. Lear also explains (p. 194) in a discussion of Freud’s analysis of Dora that he is employing the term worldliness in the ontic rather than the ontological sense, but for Heidegger worldhood (or worldliness) is an ontological category, as it is what sets human beings (Dasein) apart from animals or other things in the world of nature; that is, the “worldliness of the world” in Heidegger’s meaning is an inherently human world comprised of significance, meaning, and points of reference to the relationships we participate in that “make” us who and what we are, as humans. An ontic dimension would serve to render it a social world (i.e., the entities that constitute a social reality) as distinct from a phenomenological one (i.e., myself as a center of orientation from which I inhabit (or “dwell” in) a world that is my own, yet not strictly my invention). There is much to be said for a social critique of Freud’s conception of transference and this has been attempted by both the interpersonal and relational traditions in psychoanalysis. It goes something like this: Freud, from a positivistic framework, represents a one-person psychology that is focused on internal, unconscious processes and ultimately resorts to concepts such as projection to explain how ideas “inside” one’s mind/unconscious manage to “enter” the minds of other people. The relational perspective claims that this model denies the social dimension to reality that properly has priority over so-called individual, internal thought processes. If such processes exist (the interpersonalists would say that they do not, that there is no “internal” world to speak of), then it is secondary to the primacy of social, or intersubjective reality. Lear resists the relational and intersubjective perspective and, following Loewald, wants to correct Freud’s mistake without abandoning drive theory, as the relationalists have done. Yet his application of worldliness is muddled and leaves us wondering how it serves to correct Freud’s positivistic framework. The problem with attempting to appropriate certain concepts from Heidegger in order to revise Freud’s basic model is that Heidegger is coming from a phenomenological framework, and it is from within that framework that his concepts of world and worldliness are derived. Lear speaks of transference as phenomena, but transference, properly speaking, is not a phenomenon but a concept that Freud conceived to explain certain phenomena that arise in the psychoanalytic situation. What are those phenomena? Freud says that the principal phenomenon to which the concept of transference alludes is love. The only reason transference occurs in the first place is because it is our human nature, from Freud’s perspective, to seek love from every human encounter and that, moreover, no matter how much love we manage to accrue in our lives it will never be enough; we will always want more and consequently experience intermittent experiences of frustration and disappointment when we do not feel sufficiently loved, or appreciated, or understood, or respected, or recognized, and so on, all of which are understood as displacements or sublimations of the most raw kind of love that we first experienced at our mother’s bosom as infants. Remove the never-ending quest for love from this equation and you abandon Freud’s conception of the transference situation. Heidegger famously rejects Freud’s conception of transference along with his concept of defense mechanisms and the unconscious; they are all pieces of a whole which is based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the human condition. Let’s begin with Freud’s theory of
repression and allied defense mechanisms, generally. For Heidegger, because there is no “unconscious,” there is nothing “into” which wishes can be “repressed.” Moreover, Heidegger objects to Freud’s thesis that neurotic and other psychological conflicts are the consequence of repressed traumatic events, the memory about which the individual “instinctively” defends himself by erasing if from consciousness, via repression or other defense mechanisms. For Heidegger, there is no alleged “trauma” to defend ourselves against. Instead, he argues that we are always dimly aware of what we are anxious about, but in denial of its significance, i.e., what the “event—cum—trauma” means to me. This is the reason that Heidegger takes issue with Freud’s concept of transference and its principal vehicle, projection. Freud’s notion is that after children repress (or in the case of obsessinals, deny the significance of) painful feelings concerning a father or mother, these harbored but nonetheless unconscious memories are subsequently transferred (i.e., displaced) onto friends, lovers, and therapists with whom they become intimate, so that they experience, for example, the analyst “as though” he were the embodiment of the patient’s father or mother. Heidegger objects to the mechanistic quality of Freud’s formulations, that repressed ideas are “inserted” into an “unconscious” (as container), only to pop out later when projected onto persons and situations that trigger appropriate “recollections.” Yet even in Freud’s many discussions about the nature of transference and how it presumably works, he insists that the term should be understood as simply another word for love (Freud, 1912, 1915). The problem with humans, says Freud, is that we are born “premature” and remain dependent on our parents for a duration that is unique in the animal world. Our struggle throughout childhood is to painstakingly and ever-so-gradually wean ourselves off this extraordinary dependency. The problem we each encounter is that of learning to accept that growth and maturation entail separation from the protection and narcissistic gratification we are wont to maintain, not only with our parents, but in all our subsequent relationships. Freud maintained that we never entirely recover from the grueling, trauma ridden era of our interminable childhoods, and that we remain haunted by a kind of “lack” at the core of our being, as we wend ourselves through the world of relations with others, because we are stained by the remnants of disappointment about what our parents could or would not give us. Hollow inside, never really confidant of our place in the world, we obstinately persist, like Sisyphus, seeking signs of legitimation from everyone who constitutes our world; but most of all, from the people we genuinely care about. Substitute Freud’s emphasis on the word love with Heidegger’s care (Sorge) and their respective views of the human condition become extraordinarily compatible, if not identical. One could argue that Freud’s treatment plan was not to “cure” individuals of medical conditions, but to help his patients learn how to deal with the hardship of living with greater authenticity, a project that Heidegger would have certainly embraced.

When we take a closer look at what Freud explains the mechanism of transference is composed of, he refers to projection, regression, idealization, repetition, and displacement. All of these terms are concepts, not phenomena, as such, because we do not nor are we capable of actually experiencing these mechanisms. They comprise Freud’s theory of transference, but not what we actually experience. This is why the analyst is obliged to interpret my experiences as products of “mechanisms” of a psychological nature. For some reason Lear chooses to critique Freud’s early conceptualization of transference from his 1900 treatment of Dora, instead of the more convincing technical papers he devoted to transference between 1912 and 1915, where the relationship between transference and love come into the foreground. Lear points out the somewhat defensive nature of these earlier formulations and how convenient it was to simply blame patients who became difficult for confusing his behavior with the ghosts of infantile relationships with parental figures who were being “projected” onto Freud. Lear argues that Freud never really comes out and
says just what transference is, but I think Freud was fairly clear as to what he meant by it. It was essentially another word for love, or the quest for it, which is ubiquitous to all relationships in all aspects of life.

Lear’s effort to employ Heidegger’s concept of worldliness to modify Freud’s identification of transference with the mechanism of projection suffers to some extent from his lack of familiarity with earlier psychoanalysts who were also influenced by Heidegger in their efforts to “existentialize” the Freudian conception of the unconscious and its allied defense mechanisms into a more Heideggerian framework. He tries to situate the concept of transference into a more social framework (if not an existential one) by invoking the notion of “worldliness” to suit his purpose. Much of this work, however, has already been accomplished by earlier existential critiques of Freud’s dilemma. For example, in his phenomenological critique of psychoanalytic nomenclature R. D. Laing (1969/1961, pp. 151–173), virtually abandoned the concept of projection and substituted in its place the more experience-near term, attribution as a less positivistic (and “intrapsychic”) term for articulating the same phenomenon, but in less mechanistic garb. According to Laing, I don’t “project” qualities or beliefs or feelings onto other people via some mechanism in my head; instead I “attribute” such beliefs or feelings to others and treat them as though they actually harbor these thoughts about me. Similarly, when I become an object of such attributions by others, I cannot help but see myself as the others experience me, because (as Heidegger would concur) a bit of who I am at any moment in time is what others make of me, based on what they see in me, and in that sense, attribute to me. Similarly, I don’t “introject” into my unconscious what others “project” onto me, but rather experience the attributions that others are always making about me all the time; “they” are an aspect of who I am. But only the analytic situation permits the kind of relationship (and conversation about that relationship) that reveals these attributions to us, thereby helping us achieve a distance from their influence.

Heidegger is correct in saying there is no such thing as an “unconscious,” only being, which is another way of saying that what is hidden from me is not the “content” of an unconscious portion of my mind, but rather the meaning of such and such a circumstance that, perhaps chronically, eludes me. The psychoanalytic process is basically an instrument that, depending on whose hands take a hold of it, can be used to disclose that meaning, under the right conditions, patience and luck. This is why Heidegger has such a problem with Freud’s efforts to determine the ultimate “cause” of neurotic symptom formation. Heidegger is probably also correct in arguing that a traumatic “injury” cannot “cause” me to suffer consequent repression and psychic conflict, like a nail can cause a tire to lose air. And Heidegger is equally insightful in suggesting that it is not literally the “past” that elicits the kind of anxiety I have come to associate with the burden of living, but, as Loewald observed, a future I am trying to nudge into the present, but resists my best efforts. I like what Lear is trying to accomplish here, but Heidegger’s concept of worldliness is probably not the best place to critique it from. It’s true that the notion of world is what is critically missing in Freud and, to a significant extent, Loewald recognized the problem, though his insistence on retaining Freud’s conceptual vocabulary while redefining its varied meanings led him to stretch their efficacy beyond what they could realistically bear. And I agree with Lear that the more recent relational critique of Freud merely throws out the baby with the bathwater by effectively repeating the same problem but with different words to make their revision seem novel or new. But they don’t really correct anything because we are still burdened with the same reliance on a conception of the unconscious that relies on an inherently intrapsychic framework. Lear doesn’t take on Freud’s conception of the unconscious in his criticisms of its allied concept, transference, so he is hampered in his efforts to get to the bottom of where the problem lies: the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious.
In conclusion, Lear’s book is a mixed bag that ultimately falls short of establishing a unified and coherent critique of Loewald’s debt to Heidegger and how this results in a conception of the psychoanalytic process that is governed by our relationship with irony. The book is peppered with many wonderful insights and observations about the psychoanalytic process and I especially appreciate his allegiance to Freud’s essential method and take on the human situation. His rejection of Freud’s free association method as the cardinal principle of the analytic process in place of Gray’s ego psychological perspective is both surprising and—how should I say this?—un-Freudian, and even un-Loewaldian! Despite these criticisms his discussion of the role of irony in psychoanalysis is of much value, and any effort to pay homage to the brilliant legacy of Hans Loewald is itself well worth the price of admission.

References


